Merger Waves and the Austrian Business Cycle Theory by Saravia, Jimmy
179
Merger Waves and the austrian 
Business CyCle theory
Jimmy A. SArAviA
ABSTRACT: This paper identifies merger waves as parts of Austrian-type 
business cycles. According to Austrian business cycle theory, when loan 
rates are reduced below their natural level through bank credit expansion, 
this falsifies the monetary calculation of capitalist-entrepreneurs, and 
investments are initiated that calculation showed were not profitable 
before the interest rate reduction. Since there are not enough resources in 
the economy to complete the new projects, businesses must increasingly 
withdraw the resources from other companies. Thus, this paper concludes 
that the increase in investment activity and the resulting “resource crunch” 
cause a merger wave that helps prolong the boom phase of the cycle. The 
merger wave ends when the credit expansion is not sufficient to sustain 
the economic boom, and the bust phase begins. Conversely, this paper 
concludes that if the fiduciary media do not enter the economy through 
the loan market to finance business investment, there is no pronounced 
and sustained increase in merger activity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the main puzzles in contemporary mainstream financial economics is: why are there time periods of frantic mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) activity known as merger waves? While 
in this literature much work has been done on the causes of 
takeovers and restructuring activity at the firm and industry level, 
relatively little work has been done on the causes of economy 
wide merger waves. Moreover, the latter is divided in two rival 
camps: behavioral and neoclassical.
According to the “behavioral hypothesis” of merger waves, 
during bull markets investors irrationally misprice stocks across 
the board and rational managers, taking advantage of misper-
ceived merger synergies, use their overvalued stock to acquire the 
resources of less overvalued or undervalued companies. The main 
proponents of this theory are Shleifer and Vishny (2003). on the 
other hand, the “neoclassical hypothesis” maintains that merger 
waves are rational responses by market participants that occur 
when economic shocks (economic, regulatory, or technological), 
which call for reorganization at the industry level, overlap with 
low transaction costs that take place because of the presence of 
high “capital liquidity.” The role of capital liquidity is to reduce the 
costs of reallocating the assets, thus permitting a large volume of 
transactions to occur in a relatively short period of time. The main 
proponent of the neoclassical theory is Harford (2005).
There is a growing body of empirical literature that aims to 
test the hypotheses of the neoclassical and behavioral schools, 
which has yielded mixed results. For instance, while Harford 
(2005) finds that during the second half of the 1990s M&A activity 
was clustered in certain industries which he identifies as being 
impacted by economic shocks, and that simultaneously there was 
a positive correlation between high capital liquidity and M&A 
activity, Gärtner and Halbheer (2009) find that the 1990s M&A 
wave cannot be attributed to a temporary intensification of M&A 
activity in a small group of industries. on the other hand, while 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Dong et al. (2006) find evidence 
in favor of the behavioral theory using measures of firm over-
valuation, Harford (2005) presents several pieces of evidence that 
contradict behavioral theory. In particular, Harford finds a strong 
positive correlation between M&A activity financed using cash 
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and M&A activity financed using stock, and presents evidence 
that both increase during the M&A wave. Moreover he finds that, 
at the firm level, being a bidder in a “stock merger” increases the 
likelihood of being cash buyer of divisions of other companies 
during the M&A wave.
Now, from the Austrian perspective the causes proposed by 
these two schools (i.e., overvaluation of stocks or economic shocks 
followed by high capital liquidity which reduces transaction costs) 
cannot be accepted as ultimate causes of M&A waves. Although 
these factors may plausibly have an influence in the direction 
of the actual market process during an economic boom and the 
accompanying M&A wave, the causes of their occurrence can be 
explained in turn at a more basic level in the context of the Austrian 
business cycle theory (ABCT). 
Following standard Austrian theory step by step, in this paper 
I identify M&A waves as parts of Austrian-type business cycles. 
The argument is briefly as follows. When bank credit expansion 
reduces loan rates below their natural level, capitalist-entrepreneurs 
will tend to undertake more investments than can be completed 
with the resources available in the economy. The initiation of these 
projects launches an unsustainable economic boom, and due to the 
escalating scarcity of resources aggravated by household overcon-
sumption, businesses must increasingly withdraw the resources 
from other companies. I conclude that this increase in investment 
activity, together with the accompanying “resource crunch,” causes 
the M&A wave. If this logical deduction is correct, then the two 
standard theories in mainstream financial economics mentioned 
above are leaving out important causes of the M&A wave, such as 
the increase in investments and the scarcity of resources during the 
economic boom. Also note that in this context, the phenomenon of 
stock overvaluation highlighted by the behavioral school can be 
explained, as a result of the reduction of interest rates (when interest 
rates are artificially pushed downwards, asset prices will tend to 
artificially increase), and also as a result of the increased demand for 
the resources that the stocks give title to. on the other hand, the high 
“capital liquidity” pointed out by the neoclassical school is explained 
in the context of ABCT as a result of bank credit expansion.1
1  Theoretical variations on the neoclassical and behavioral themes are provided 
by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and 
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In considering the Austrian theory of M&A waves presented 
in the next section, it is important to keep in mind that the entre-
preneurial function in the theory is provided by the capitalist-
entrepreneurs. That is, by “the speculators, promoters, investors 
and money lenders” who determine “the structure of the stock 
and commodity exchanges and of the money market” and the 
“allocation of capital to firms and industries.” (Mises, 1998, p. 704; 
Rothbard, 1991, p. 58). Moreover, there is an important difference 
between entrepreneurship and management. The function of the 
entrepreneur is “to appraise—to anticipate—future prices, and to 
allocate resources accordingly” (Rothbard, 1991, p. 66, emphasis in 
the original). In contrast, the managerial function is a “subsidiary 
service.” Thus, when in this paper it is stated that corporate 
managements undertake investments, it is important to bear in 
mind that they do so in execution of the tasks delegated to them by 
the capitalist-entrepreneurs (Mises, 1998, p. 703). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 I briefly 
go over the main arguments of ABCT and indicate how M&A waves 
rise and wane. In section 3, I provide an illustration of the theory 
by examining the history for the United States in the last 20 years. 
In particular, I draw attention to the fact that when fiduciary media 
entered the economy through the loan market to finance business 
investment, Austrian business cycles accompanied by M&A waves 
occurred, but that when newly created money did not enter the 
economy through the loan market to finance business investment, 
there was no pronounced and sustained spike in merger activity 
although stock prices and liquidity were at historic highs. I conclude 
in section 4 by summing up and reinterpreting some of the findings of 
the behavioral and neoclassical schools in light of the Austrian theory.
2. M&A WAVES AS PART OF ABCT
According to the ABCT, the business cycle is caused by a 
reduction of the interest rate below its natural level when newly 
Gugler et al. (2012). However, since these theories are susceptible to the same 
critique above—namely that from the Austrian perspective the causes put forward 
by these theories cannot be accepted as ultimate causes of M&A waves, and that 
such causes in turn can be explained at a more basic level in the context of the 
ABCT—in the interests of brevity I do not discuss them here.
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produced fiduciary media, created by the financial system, enters 
the economy through the loan market and falsifies the monetary 
calculation of capitalist-entrepreneurs and households (Mises, 
1998; Hayek, 2008; Rothbard, 2009). This artificial reduction in 
the rates of interest has two effects which constitute the essential 
features of the Austrian business cycle: “malinvestment” and 
“overconsumption” (Salerno, 2012).  
on the one hand, the artificial reduction of interest rates leads 
capitalist-entrepreneurs to believe that society has become thriftier 
and that the level of savings has increased, when in fact the interest 
rate is too low in comparison with society’s time preference. This in 
turn prompts them to overestimate the amount of resources available 
to invest and to begin more projects than can be finished with the 
available means of production. Moreover, the proportion of longer-
term projects will increase relative to short-term projects as their 
present value will increase more due to the interest rate reduction, 
and as a consequence the structure of production is lengthened. This 
unsustainable lengthening of the structure of production constitutes 
the malinvestment feature of the inflationary boom. on the other 
hand, the fall in interest rates also falsifies households’ appraisals of 
their income and wealth. This comes about through what is called 
the “wealth effect.” As the inflationary boom proceeds and factors of 
production become more scarce, salaries are bid up and asset prices 
(such as stocks and real state) also go higher (Bagus, 2008). Thus 
households feel wealthier and more optimistic about their future 
income streams. This causes them to over-consume, save less and 
even go into debt as they mistakenly believe they can afford it. This 
constitutes the overconsumption aspect of the Austrian business 
cycle (Salerno, 2012). 
overconsumption aggravates even more the erroneous assessment 
regarding the availability of investable resources made by the 
capitalist-entrepreneurs, and the scarcity of all kinds of resources 
eventually becomes evident as prices for those resources start to soar. 
As businesses increase their demands from the several resource and 
labor markets, these ultimately become depleted and the resources, 
if available, of relatively lower quality and expensive. Therefore, 
firms must increasingly withdraw resources from other companies.
As pointed out by Klein (1999) company managements supplement 
their normal forms of investment (i.e., capital expenditures and 
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R&D) by acquiring the resources of existing firms through merger. 
Under normal conditions, one important reason why the latter 
occurs is that the acquisition of an already established firm or 
company division may be the best and quickest means to undertake 
an investment opportunity when the “capacities of the existing 
managerial personnel of the firm” are not sufficient to embark on 
the investment through the purchase of new plant and machinery, 
that is, through internal growth (Penrose, 1995, pp. 45–49 and 
127–131). Thus, as investment activity increases in the earlier stages 
of the boom, it is logical to deduce that M&A activity will increase 
as well, and this initiates the merger wave. However, as mentioned 
above the economy’s resources are not sufficient to complete all the 
projects. Thus the question that capitalist-entrepreneurs and their 
managements ultimately face is: what can be done to finalize the 
investments or at least to continue them one more period of time? 
Clearly, if resources are scarce and costly, it should become easier for 
capitalist-entrepreneurs and firm managements to see the operating 
economies that can result from eliminating duplicate facilities, and 
consolidating the marketing, purchasing and accounting operations. 
on the other hand, during the boom, synergy and economy of scale 
stories are easier to make and back with numbers. For example, a 
company that increases its productive capacity may find its sales 
force inadequate and that synergies can be achieved by merging 
with another firm with a strong sales force. Thus, in order to 
complete the projects, one solution can be either to purchase another 
company or sell one’s own firm to a business that has the resources 
to complement your investments. In addition, this would also have 
the advantage of reducing the number of firms competing for the 
same pool of resources.
I conclude that, facing a “resource crunch,” businesses must 
increasingly find it advantageous to merge with other companies. 
Therefore, during the inflationary boom, one should expect to see 
both an exceptionally high demand of resources in the different 
markets (manifested, for example, in a very low unemployment 
rate and high resource prices) and an unusually high level of 
M&A activity. Interestingly, the increased M&A activity also 
explains why past economic booms have seemed to last longer 
than one would expect if companies could only draw their factors 
of production from the different resource and labor markets. 
185Jimmy A. Saravia: Merger Waves and the Austrian Business Cycle Theory
Without the possibility of extracting the necessary resources from 
other companies, many projects would need to halt in a relatively 
short period of time after their start due to a shortage of inputs. 
Under this scenario, many investments would quickly fail, the 
banks would become concerned about the quality of their loans 
and tighten credit standards earlier, and consequently the bust 
would occur much sooner. In contrast, by taking their resources 
from other companies through merger, capitalist-entrepreneurs 
and their managements can carry out their projects and postpone 
the bust for a while.
In this context, the economic, regulatory and technological 
shocks proposed by the neoclassical literature (Harford, 2005) have 
a role in determining in which industries the M&A wave is more 
pronounced. In particular, as Callahan and Garrison (2003, p. 74) 
have pointed out, “every bubble needs a story, which early investors 
can tell to later ones to justify rising asset prices,” and it is clear 
that technological innovation, such as the internet in the 1990s and 
episodes of deregulation, can serve this purpose. This is not to deny 
that an economic, regulatory or technological shock can prompt 
a legitimate reallocation of assets in an industry. Austrian theory 
demonstrates that, in the absence of bank credit expansion, capi-
talist-entrepreneurs relying on sound monetary calculation would 
proficiently undertake the reallocation of assets over time with some 
occasional errors, but nothing in the way of a manic episode with 
a clustering of entrepreneurial error ending in an economy-wide 
crisis. The important point is that, in a monetary regime in which 
bank credit expansion is allowed, the M&A wave should be more 
pronounced in those industries where there is a good story to justify 
the high asset prices. And a convincing economic, regulatory or 
technological shock can provide such a narrative.
The M&A wave ends with the Austrian-type business cycle, 
when the credit expansion is not sufficient to sustain the economic 
boom, which usually occurs when central banks finally detect in 
their aggregate measurements that price inflation is increasing 
sharply. At this point the authorities have two options, to continue 
stimulating the economy and risking a “crack-up boom” (Mises, 
1998), or tighten monetary policy and let interest rates rise again. 
If the latter option is chosen, the overextended financial system 
becomes increasingly concerned as the errors committed in the 
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boom become evident, credit standards are tightened and the 
crisis begins. As a result, consumption and investment plummet, 
unemployment rises and M&A activity falls. 
Finally, it is important to point out that if the newly created 
fiduciary media do not enter the economy through the loan 
market to finance business investment and distort the structure of 
production, there is no Austrian-type boom-bust cycle. If so, there 
should be no pronounced and sustained spike in merger activity 
and the accompanying clustering of entrepreneurial error.
3. HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATION
This section provides an illustration of the Austrian M&A wave 
theory by examining the history of the United States in the last 
twenty years. During this period Austrian economists successfully 
identified in advance two Austrian-type business cycles developing 
in the U.S. economy (Thornton, 2013). Moreover, after each of 
the busts, Austrian economists such as Callahan and Garrison 
(2003) and Salerno (2012) provided detailed accounts about the 
two episodes as well as commentaries about the prospects for the 
future. Hence, in what follows I take it as a historical fact that there 
occurred two Austrian-type business cycles in the period under 
question, and therefore, my focus will be in indicating how M&A 
waves were a part of these boom-bust cycles.
First Business Cycle (from 1995 to 2002). 
According to Callahan and Garrison (2003), the first business 
cycle in the relevant period occurred between 1995 and 2002. In 
their paper, the immediate cause of the cycle is identified as the 
loose monetary policy of the Fed prior to the 1996 presidential 
elections. Moreover, a series of crises forced the Fed to continue 
with its expansive monetary stance through early 2000, even 
though the economy was showing signs of overheating. The low 
interest rates and fiduciary media created by the financial system 
falsified the capitalist-entrepreneurs monetary calculation, which 
in turn started to malinvest, notably in dot-com and telecommuni-
cation companies, but also in other sectors of the economy. Figure 1 
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shows the high levels of net private investment during the boom.2 
As can be seen, net investment peaked in 2000.
Figure 1.  Net Private Domestic Investment: Net Fixed Investment 
(A560RC1A027NBEA). Source: FRED.
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The monetary stimulus also resulted in overall high stock prices, 
which peaked in March of 2000 (Figure 2) and through the “wealth 
effect” induced households to over-consume, produced a collapse 
in savings and an increase in household indebtedness. In particular, 
households reduced their personal savings rate from around 9 
percent in the early 1990s to 4 percent in 1999–2000.3 Additionally, 
the increase in indebtedness is reflected in the increment in debt 
service payments as a percent of personal disposable income, which 
increased from 11 percent to close to 13 percent in the 1990s.4
2  The figure presents net investment rather than gross investment given that the 
former is a measurement of expenditure in excess of that required to maintain the 
existing capital structure.
3  Personal savings rate, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. louis, Series ID: PSAVERT.
4  Debt service payments as a percent of personal disposable income, Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. louis, Series ID: TDSP.
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Figure 2.  Wilshire 5000 Price Index. Source: FRED.
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Crucially, the capital consumption and malinvestment resulted 
in a shortage of resources and workers in the different industries. 
Callahan and Garrison (2003, p. 87) draw attention to the scarcity 
of resources in the dot-com sector:
There were too few resources available for all of the plans formulated 
and funded during the boom to succeed… There were shortages of 
programmers, network engineers, technical managers, office space, 
housing for workers, and other factors of production.
Finally, Callahan and Garrison indicate that the business cycle 
ended when Fed tightened monetary policy in 2000 and punctured 
the bubble. As a result, an economic recession ensued and the 1990s 
boom came to an end. 
I conclude from the foregoing that as investment activity 
increased in the earlier stages of the boom (Figure 1), merger 
activity also increased as company managements supplemented 
their normal forms of investment (i.e. capital expenditures and 
R&D) by acquiring the resources of existing firms through merger. 
This initiated the M&A wave. Moreover, I deduce that the “resource 
crunch” described by Callahan and Garrison (2003) intensified the 
M&A wave of the late 1990s and that the increased M&A activity 
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allowed the boom to persist for a while for the reasons stated in 
section 2. Finally, the M&A wave ended when the bust set in and 
the errors committed during the boom became manifest to most 
economic actors. As a result, some of the investments lost most 
of their value and others had to be liquidated. The extent of the 
M&A wave of the late 1990s can be illustrated with the help of 
Table 1 and Figure 3. As can be seen, the value of announced M&A 
transactions tripled from $676 billion in 1995 to $2,140 billion in 
1999 and then fell considerably to $521 billion in 2002 once the bust 
set in. The wave is also reflected in the number of announced M&A 
transactions which increased from 11,206 in 1995 to 15,454 in 1998, 
and then fell to 8,670 in 2002.
Table 1.  Announced Mergers & Acquisitions: USA, 1994–2013. 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances.
Year Number of Deals Deal Value (in Bil. USD)
1994 9,432 422
1995 11,206 676
1996 12,620 752
1997 13,874 1,119
1998 15,454 1,817
1999 13,814 2,140
2000 14,161 1,971
2001 9,719 1,011
2002 8,670 521
2003 9,377 670
2004 10,781 1,003
2005 11,506 1,341
2006 13,184 1,855
2007 14,230 1,975
2008 11,966 1,217
2009 9,648 879
2010 10,402 982
2011 10,728 1,257
2012 10,732 987
2013 10,327 1,144
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Figure 3.  Announced Mergers & Acquisitions: USA, 1994–2013. 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances.
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Second Business Cycle (from 2002 to 2009).  
The second Austrian-type business cycle in the period under 
study occurred between 2002 and 2009, and is described in detail 
by Salerno (2012). The Fed reacted immediately to the recession of 
the early 2000s by aggressively lowering interest rates and taking 
measures to expand the money supply. Notably, the Fed kept the 
federal funds rate under 2 percent for three years from December 
2001 to November 2004. More importantly, there was a sharp 
reduction in 30-year conventional mortgage rates and adjustable 
mortgage rates, which combined with loose credit standards, 
resulted in a housing bubble that peaked in 2006. The monetary 
stimulus also caused a steep ascent in stock prices which continued 
go up until 2007 (Figure 2). These developments created a “wealth 
effect” that led households to overconsume and go into debt, as 
stated by Salerno (2012, p. 30):
Misled by their inflation-bloated balance sheets, households were induced 
to “cash out” some of their home equity and increase expenditures 
on consumer goods and services. In the expression of the day, people 
began “using their homes as ATM machines.” Households financed their 
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increased spending on boats, luxury autos, upscale restaurant meals, 
pricy vacations etc., through fixed-dollar debt.
The wealth illusion also produced a reduction in saving. The 
personal saving rate as a percent of disposable income fell from 
slightly over 5 percent in early 2002 to 2 percent in 2005.5
on the other hand, the extent of the malinvestments during 
the 2002–2009 boom-bust cycle is illustrated in Figure 1. As can 
be seen, after falling to $538 billion in 2002, net private domestic 
investment resumed its growth and reached a peak at $849 billion 
in 2006. As in the previous cycle, the boom came to an end as the 
Fed raised interest rates. on this occasion, the errors committed 
during the boom became dramatically manifest in the housing 
market. This had dire implications for the financial system as most 
of the housing investors were highly levered with bank credit and 
their mass defaults brought the prospect of the failure of many 
banks. This in turn triggered bank runs and financial instability, 
which prompted the federal government and the Federal Reserve 
to take unprecedented measures to prevent a financial collapse. 
Importantly, in this second boom-bust cycle it is possible to 
discern the same pattern in M&A activity. As investment activity 
started to pick up again in 2003 (Figure 1), M&A activity also 
started to increase as company managements supplemented their 
investments in R&D and capital expenditures with mergers and 
acquisitions (Table 1 and Figure 3). Moreover, as the overcon-
sumption described by Salerno (2012) and net private investment 
intensified, another “resource crunch” situation developed, which 
intensified the M&A wave. The mergers allowed the boom to 
continue for a while (see section 2). The M&A wave ended as the 
Fed tightened monetary policy, triggering the bust. As shown in 
Table 1 and Figure 3, the value of announced M&A transactions 
almost quadrupled from $521 billion in 2002 to $1,975 billion in 
2007 and then more than halved to $879 billion in 2009. The M&A 
wave is also reflected in the number of announced M&A trans-
actions, which increased from 8,670 in 2002 to 14,230 in 2007 and 
then fell to 9,648 in 2009.
5 See footnote 4 for the sources of data on the personal savings rate.
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Economic Stagnation (from 2009 to … ). 
Following the financial crisis, the Fed reacted aggressively with 
a series of Quantitative Easing (QE) programs that have boosted 
the monetary base at an unprecedented rate. In addition, the Fed 
reduced the federal funds rate to close to zero percent in December 
2008—where they have been kept and are expected to be main-
tained for the foreseeable future—and has taken steps to bring 
down long term interest rates as well (the so-called “operation 
Twist”). Although these measures have succeeded in re-inflating 
stock market price indices which have recently reached historic 
highs (Figure 2), on this occasion the stimulus has failed to restore 
the growth of bank credit expansion to the double-digit annual 
growth rates observed during the last two business cycles,6 and 
net private domestic investment has remained depressed with the 
2012 figure 60 percent below the 2006 high of $849 billion (Figure 
1). Thus, in the period after the financial crisis, the newly created 
money has not entered the economy through the loan market to 
finance business investment. Instead the money has been flowing 
to the financial markets to inflate the prices of financial assets and to 
finance trillion-dollar federal government deficits. Now, if the newly 
created money is not entering the economy through the loan market 
to finance business investment to distort the structure of production, 
there can be no boom-bust cycle of the Austrian type. Instead, 
Austrian theory indicates that there will be price inflation and 
wealth redistribution from the productive classes of society to those 
best placed to take advantage of the consequences of the inflation. 
Importantly, as pointed out in section 2 above, if there is no Austrian 
business cycle developing, there ought not to be a pronounced and 
sustained spike in M&A activity followed by a crisis that reveals a 
cluster of investment errors on the part of capitalist-entrepreneurs. 
Hence, contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical and behavioral 
theories of M&A waves, in a period such as the one at hand in which 
capitalist-entrepreneurs have temporarily lost their confidence in 
the reliability of economic calculation (Salerno, 2012), regime uncer-
tainty is high (Higgs, 1997; id., 2012) and consequently investment 
activity is low, there should be no M&A wave even though (a) stock 
6  Total loans and leases, percentage changes from a year ago, Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. louis, Series ID: ToTll.
193Jimmy A. Saravia: Merger Waves and the Austrian Business Cycle Theory
prices are being inflated to record highs through monetary policy 
(conflicting with the behavioral theory), and (b) strong economic 
shocks and dislocations overlap with unprecedented levels of 
liquidity in the stock markets (opposite to the neoclassical theory). 
The conclusion of no M&A wave without an Austrian-type 
business cycle is consistent with the history of M&A activity in the 
period after the financial crisis. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, 
after falling to $879 and $982 billion in 2009 and 2010 respectively, 
there was a “dead cat bounce” in the value of announced M&A 
activity to $1,257 billion in 2011 before falling back down again 
to $987 billion in 2012. This see-saw pattern has continued with 
another increase to $1,144 billion in 2013. These figures are between 
35 to 55 percent lower than the high reached in the previous cycle 
of $1,975 billion in 2007, so there are no signs of a merger mania 
when examining the value of M&A activity after the financial crisis. 
Additionally, a pronounced spike in the number of announced 
M&A transactions has also not occurred. After falling to 9,648 deals 
in 2009, the number of transactions gradually increased to 10,728 
in 2011, and lately it has gone down to 10,327 in 2013—this latter 
number still 27 percent below the 14,230 figure reached in 2007. 
4. CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of the business cycle, their accompanying 
M&A waves and the economic impoverishment they bring 
are not a feature of the free market as many economists have 
uncritically assumed. Instead, as the Austrian school maintains, 
these phenomena are the result of the way in which the monetary 
and banking systems have been historically organized. To prevent 
business cycles and M&A waves, the solution would involve a 
reform in which the reduction of interest rates below their natural 
level through bank credit expansion is ruled out.
once an Austrian-type boom-bust cycle is under way, the 
behavioral school is correct, I believe, in that some of the M&A 
activity will occur as managers, taking advantage of misperceived 
merger synergies, use their overvalued stock to acquire the resources 
of less overvalued or undervalued companies. However, the cause 
of the radical mispricing of the stocks are not some mysterious 
“animal spirits.” Rather, it is the result of the falsification of the 
194 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 17, No. 2 (2014)
households’ and capitalist-entrepreneurs’ monetary calculations. 
This suggests that in addition to studying human behavior under 
conditions of uncertainty, behavioral economists should also 
study human behavior under false information about their wealth, 
income and investment prospects. 
 on the other hand, the neoclassical school has a point in indicating 
that economic, technological and regulatory shocks and excessive 
liquidity have a role in M&A waves. However, in the context of 
the ABCT the role of the shocks is to provide a story to justify the 
bubble as Callahan and Garrison (2003) have pointed out. In this 
sense, the bubble will tend to be more pronounced in those sectors 
where a more credible case for the boom can be made. Moreover, 
the excess liquidity is not something that just happens cyclically 
and endogenously in the free market. Instead, it is the result of the 
monetary intervention and the bank credit expansion that existing 
institutional arrangements allow. In another vein, the neoclassical 
school is too sanguine in supposing that M&A waves are an optimal 
response to certain disturbances and that capitalist-entrepreneurs 
are basically omniscient and never make mistakes. In fact, capitalist-
entrepreneurs do make mistakes and under free market capitalism 
with sound money, entrepreneurs would still make some mistakes 
evenly over time. What needs explanation is why entrepreneurial 
mistakes tend to cluster and are identified at some points in time we 
call recessions. I submit that ABCT is our best explanation of why 
these clusters of entrepreneurial mistakes occur.
Ultimately, from the perspective of the Austrian school, the 
behavioral and neoclassical schools do not identify the underlying 
causes of M&A waves. Although the factors proposed may 
plausibly have an influence in the direction of the actual market 
process during an economic boom and the accompanying M&A 
wave, the causes of their occurrence can be explained a more basic 
level in the context of ABCT. Financial economists would do well to 
incorporate the insights of the Austrian school in their work; many 
of the puzzles of modern finance could be solved in this way.
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